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THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR THE GRAIL: PERRY ON THE
JUSTIFICATORY ROLE OF RELIGIOUS REASONS
Christopher J. Eberle*
AN INITIAL PROTEST
It is with regret that I am compelled to include a protest in my contribution.
The Emory Law Journal has refused to include one author’s contribution to this
Festschrift. This was an act of censorship: the editors took issue with the author’s
discussion of systematic racism, finding his words “hurtful and unnecessarily
divisive.” By itself, that decision is inconsequential; when aggregated with what
appear to be ever greater numbers of comparable editorial decisions in higher
education, it is malign. I cannot, therefore, contribute to this Festschrift without
expressing my clear dissent. I do so, moreover, with great sadness: I wished to
honor Michael Perry without qualification or distraction—the focus should be
on him, not on the editors or even on the contributors. The decision on the part
of the editors is particularly inapposite given Michael’s longstanding
commitment to an ecumenical politics, which, as we see in what follows,
encourages vigorous debate as between people of goodwill regarding the most
contentious topics, an aspiration that would have been furthered by the inclusion
of the offending essay.

*

United States Naval Academy.
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AN APPRECIATIVE INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to have been invited to honor Michael Perry. I will take this
invitation as an opportunity to reflect on a topic that Michael has described as a
“scholarly obsession” for him, viz., the “proper role of religion in the politics
and law of a liberal democracy.”1 I will focus in this paper on one of the main
topics that falls under that broad rubric, namely, the justificatory role of religious
reasons in a liberal polity. In order to do so, I have worked my way through a
number of his publications: Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality
in American Politics,2 Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral
Perspectives,3 Under God?: Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy,4 The
Political Morality of Liberal Democracy,5 and A Global Political Morality:
Human Rights, Democracy, and Constitutionalism.6 Reacquainting myself with
Michael’s contributions has been a pleasure, not least because doing so has
evoked fond memories of conversations with Michael about the many topics he
addressed therein. I first met Michael in 1998 as a result of our shared interest
in the public role of religion in liberal polities, and I am most grateful for many
subsequent years of mutual collaboration, discussion, and disagreement. His
commitment to the inherent dignity of each human being, to the bearing of his
faith on difficult practical and theoretical problems, and to a conception of
liberalism that welcomes a robust public role for citizens of faith—both secular
and religious—has long served for me as a model worthy of emulation.
1
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 2 (2010) [hereinafter PERRY,
POLITICAL MORALITY].
2
MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(1991) [hereinafter PERRY, LOVE AND POWER].
3
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997)
[hereinafter PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS].
4
UNDER GOD?: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003) [hereinafter PERRY, UNDER GOD?].
5
PERRY, POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1.
6
MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2017) [hereinafter PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY].
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Let me emphasize at the outset one excellence that is strikingly apparent
from an assessment of Michael’s work as a whole. He has not articulated one
conception of the proper political role of religion and then bunkered down to
fend off all comers. The trajectory of his thought is less defensive than
adventurous. As we will see, Michael searches over a period of decades for a
properly ecumenical conception of how the ever more diversely committed and
pluralistic population of the United States should conduct its common affairs.
As with any real quest, he meets unexpected barriers and hidden obstacles that
necessitate course corrections and directional alterations. I greatly prize his
willingness to think deeply about the most contentious religious and political
matters, to draw clearly articulated and thoughtful conclusions thereabout, and
then to revise those conclusions in light of ensuing criticism. Given the
inevitable complexity and inherent difficulty of his chosen subject matter, it is
the reverse of surprising that his search for a properly ecumenical politics has
taken him in a number of different directions. Hence his extended, circuitous
quest for a morally plausible and otherwise defensible understanding of the
justificatory role of religion in public life.
These personal reflections indicate my aims in this Essay. In Parts I through
IV, I delineate the main stages in Michael’s scholarly journey, articulating the
various constraints on religious reasons for which he has argued over the past
thirty years, excavating normative commitments that have guided him
throughout that journey and explaining why those guiding commitments led him
to different, and in some cases quite distant, destinations. This retrospective,
expository aim drives a substantial part of this paper. In Part V, I employ
Michael’s work to assess one of the best recent discussions of the proper
justificatory role of religious reasons, viz., Cécile Laborde’s Liberalism’s
Religion.7 I take Michael to provide excellent reason substantially to qualify
Laborde’s claim that state officials ought not appeal to revelatory reasons as
grounds for state policies.8 Finally, in the conclusion, I assess Michael’s most
recent work, most particularly his claim that a liberal democracy ought not enact
a coercive or discriminatory law for which there exists no plausible secular
rationale.9 I will do so largely by appealing to Michael against himself: as I see
it, his earlier arguments provide reason at least to qualify, if not to abandon, the
restrictive position that he has most recently adopted. In pursuing each of these
aims, I hope that this paper exemplifies the kind of ecumenical political dialogue

7
8
9

CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION (2017).
See id. at 120–21.
PERRY, POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1, at 100–99.
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between diversely committed interlocutors to which Michael has long been
devoted. That is the best way that I can think of to honor him.
I.

MICHAEL PERRY’S QUEST FOR AN ECUMENICAL POLITICS

The broad topic that I address is a familiar one: the justificatory role that
religious reasons properly play in the public life of a liberal democracy like the
United States. As I understand it, this topic is not centrally legal or constitutional
but moral—having to do with the moral obligations attached to the social role of
citizen, state official, and judge.10 Broadly speaking, when we attempt to
ascertain the justificatory role that religious reasons may play in the public life
of a liberal polity, we attempt to answer two distinct questions. The first is a
matter of political decision-making: in what respects, if any, may a citizen or
state official make a political decision (say, to vote for some coercive state
policy) that depends for its justification on a religious rationale?11 The second is
a matter of public deliberation: in what respects, if any, may a citizen or state
official appeal to religious reasons as she deliberates with her compatriots as to
which political decision they ought to make (say, to vote against some coercive
state policy)?12 Over the past three decades or so, a great many philosophers,
lawyers, political theorists, theologians, and even politicians have articulated
various distinct ways to formulate these questions and an ever-greater number
of competing answers thereto—various competing justificatory restrictions that
specify how citizens and state officials may employ religious reasons in political
decision-making and public deliberation. In Perry’s idiolect, these competing
answers have ranged from very restrictive versions of exclusionism to radically
open conceptions of inclusionism.13
As I read him, the overall trajectory of Perry’s thought is from a moderate
exclusionism to a successively more capacious, but not uncritical, inclusionism
and then to a somewhat more restrictive inclusionism. What does that mean?
Exclusionism is roughly the view that “religious faith has little if any legitimate

10
MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 35–36. Perry does discuss in some detail the bearing
of relevant legal or constitutional norms on our topic. See PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 2, at 112–22;
PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 9–42; PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 3–34; PERRY,
POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1, at 100–99. I am happy to leave the law to lawyers. Given that our
understanding of the moral propriety of reliance on religious reasons should drive our understanding of the legal
propriety thereof, I focus exclusively on the various moral arguments that bear on the proper justificatory role
of religious reasons in public life.
11
PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 35.
12
Id.
13
Id. at x–xiii, 51–52, 124–30.
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role to play in American politics”14 and so “should be excluded, as much as
possible, from” the “public life of the nation.”15 By contrast, inclusionists
believe that religious faith may play a robust justificatory role in public advocacy
and decision-making: “The inclusionists affirm, and the exclusionists deny, that
religion may play a significant role in politics.”16 So described, the difference
between the two views is not categorical but scalar: a conception of the
justificatory role of religious reasons will be more or less exclusionist—and less
or more inclusionist—as determined by the extent to which a theorist believes
that religious faith has a legitimate role to play in public life. The degree to which
a justificatory restriction counts as exclusionist is a function of at least two
distinct and independently varying factors, viz., scope and stringency.
Consider the following constraint: a citizen or state official may accord no
justificatory weight whatsoever to any religious reason, whatever its content or
epistemic status, when deciding whether to support or oppose a coercive state
policy. This is a highly exclusive restriction. That is, it has universal scope in
that it applies to all religious reasons, citizens, and state officials. And it is quite
stringent, as it permits religious reasons to play no justificatory role at all in
political decision-making, not even an entirely supplementary role when they
converge with sufficient secular reasons. Less exclusive is a similarly stringent
but considerably less capacious constraint, such as that a citizen or state official
may accord no justificatory weight in political decision-making to any
revelatory reason, whether biblical, koranic, or otherwise. Less exclusive again
is a restriction that has very wide scope, yet is so lax as to preclude reliance on
few, if any, important religious reasons—e.g., that a citizen or state official may
appeal in public deliberation to only those religious reasons the content of which
her compatriots can comprehend. Since nearly every religious reason is
comprehensible to others, this constraint, while quite wide in scope, lacks
stringency and so would permit reliance on nearly any religious reason. If I
understand Perry correctly, such a justificatory constraint falls on the
inclusionist end of the spectrum. Even more inclusionary would be the denial of
any justificatory restrictions that apply to religious reasons—even restrictions
that prohibit reliance on reasons that are flatly incompatible with core,
ecumenical, liberal commitments. I know of no theorist who affirms such a
radically expansive conception. Certainly not Perry—although he moves ever
further from his moderately exclusionist origins, he steers clear of the most
expansive inclusionist destinations.
14
15
16

Id. at 124.
Id. at 51.
Id.
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II. PERRY’S MODERATE EXCLUSIONISM
Let me now turn to Perry’s scholarly peregrinations among the various
options. His earliest book-length treatment of the justificatory role of religious
reasons, Love and Power, begins with a clear and concise reconstruction of the
core claims of what was then a familiar flavor of liberal political theory—a
neutralist liberalism paradigmatically captured in the claim that “[a] citizen
should (seek to) justify a political choice to fellow citizens only on the basis of
moral premises shared with all to whom she is justifying the choice.”17 Since no
religious reason is shared with all citizens, such a stringent conception might be
taken to have exclusionist implications on a very wide scope.18 Perry articulates
compelling objections to this kind of conception—not least that its justificatory
constraints are “impossibly restrictive,” so stringent as to render us unable to
vindicate core liberal commitments.19 He concludes that neutralist liberalism is
a normative dead end: “[T]he quest for the Holy Grail of neutral/impartial
political justification is spent.”20 He then embarks on “a different, more
promising path.”21 The remainder of Love and Power pursues an alternative to
neutralist liberalism—an “ecumenical” conception of liberalism that enables a
diversely committed population to foster the bonds of political community by
way of how individuals engage with one another in public.22 Roughly, Perry’s
understanding of an ecumenical conception of liberalism is one that is acceptable
to as many morally decent and epistemically competent citizens as is feasible
under conditions of extensive pluralism of belief.
For Perry, a properly ecumenical politics requires citizens and state officials
to debate, discuss, and aspire to persuade one another about how to best conduct
their common affairs, particularly regarding which coercive policies the state
ought to enact. Of course, political “dialogue” can corrode the bonds of political
community: as we all know from recent years, we can discuss and debate with
one another about our common affairs in ways that drive us apart, alienate
others, insult our compatriots, and the like. For Perry, it is axiomatic that we
aspire to avoid that kind of destructive, community-corroding dialogical
agonism. Rather, we ought to engage in ecumenical political dialogue, whereby
17

PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 2, at 9.
It does not actually have any such implication: this formulation specifies nothing in particular about
what ought to happen should the required search for the desired rationale ends in failure. Only if we suppress its
parenthetical qualifier, as often happens with formulations of this sort, does this formulation have any
exclusionary implications.
19
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 2, at 96–97.
20
Id. at 28.
21
Id.
22
See id. at 83–138.
18
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“we continually cultivate the bonds of political community—and in which we
sometimes succeed in strengthening those bonds, even, occasionally, in forging
new bonds—through dialogue of a certain kind.”23 By engaging in open, selfcritical, mutually respectful discussion and debate about “our life in common,”
we can achieve all manner of morally important aims.24 So, for example, we can
avoid the leading alternative to the dialogical resolution of our disagreements:
“Political violence, or the threat of such violence, is an alternative to political
dialogue, but in our culture it is virtually axiomatic that dialogue is preferable to
violence.”25 Civil dialogue is the far superior alternative to civil war, and
“[c]ivility dies with the death of dialogue.”26 We are thereby able to “come to
the truest knowledge of ourselves.”27 We fulfill “our nature as social beings.”28
We satisfy our duty to love one another.29 In short, ecumenical political dialogue
is overdetermined by very great moral goods. This aspiration to the ecumenical
is at the very heart of Perry’s moral and religious sensibility, and it provides
constant normative guidance throughout his reflections on the justificatory role
of religious reasons.
Perry’s commitment to ecumenical political dialogue drives his favored
constraints on religious reasons: in order to participate in the dialogical
engagement that is essential to a healthy, well-functioning liberal democracy,
citizens and state officials need to comply with a number of justificatory
conditions. I will mention two. First, according to Perry, we may offer only
intelligible reasons in public deliberation.30 Intelligibility is a matter of
comprehension by others: a reason is intelligible to others when its content can
be understood by “those who speak a different religious or moral language.”31
As I see it, Perry’s intelligibility constraint is entirely sensible—citizens and
state officials in a liberal democracy must engage one another in dialogue about
our common affairs, but we cannot engage one another in a genuine dialogue if
we cannot understand one another, and so we must offer to one another reasons
that our compatriots can understand. I shall say no more about it, other than that
even the most “sectarian” religious reasons are comprehensible to others, and so
the intelligibility constraint is compatible with a very capacious public role for

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 45.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 106 (quoting JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 14 (1960)).
Id. at 49 (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
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religious reasons. Although universal in scope, the intelligibility constraint is
easy to satisfy and so is compatible with a very expansive inclusionism.
Matters are quite different with respect to Perry’s second justificatory
constraint: accessibility. This is, Perry says, “the essential criterion”—either we
abide by “a criterion like that of public accessibility” or we “giv[e] up on the
possibility of ecumenical political dialogue or anything like it.”32 Public
accessibility is a function of intersubjective uptake: a reason is publicly
accessible when it is widely regarded as having some normative force.33 So, says
Perry, a publicly accessible reason is neither sectarian nor authoritarian—
regarded by others as having little authority beyond the confines of some
particular moral or religious community.34 In short, citizens and state officials
must engage in discussion, dialogue, and debate about which state policies merit
their support. This is possible only if they offer one another reasons that others
can acknowledge to have some normative force, and so they must offer one
another reasons that those who do not belong to their particular religious
community take to have some normative weight, even if they disagree as to the
dialectical or justificatory purposes to which those reasons are put.35
Some theorists have claimed that the public accessibility constraint, properly
understood, excludes any and all religious reasons from public deliberation and
political deliberation. It has global religious scope and is, so far, highly
exclusionary. Not so Perry: he understands his accessibility constraint to have
differential application to distinct kinds of religious reason. Some religious
reasons are accessible, and some are inaccessible.36 By implication, some
religious reasons have justificatory force: citizens and state officials may rely on
them both to make political decisions and to advocate in favor of their favored
public policies. By implication again, some religious reasons lack justificatory
force: they are not amenable to assessment by those who do not share their faith,
others cannot therefore determine whether those reasons are dispositive, and

32

Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 106.
34
This is my gloss on Perry’s explication of the concept of public accessibility in Love and Power. Id.
35
Perry denies that public accessibility implies agreement: a citizen or state official can adduce a publicly
accessible reason in favor of some state policy even though some of her compatriots may, without any moral or
epistemic impropriety, deny that that reason does in fact vindicate that policy. So, political dialogue conducted
entirely in the currency of publicly accessible reasons need not generate, and is almost certainly destined not to
generate, agreement or consensus. See id. at 118. As we will see, Laborde adopts a conception of public
accessibility that is strikingly similar to Perry’s, both with respect to her understanding and her application of
that constraint. See infra Part V.
36
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 2, at 108.
33
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therefore, no citizen or state official may appeal to those religious reasons in
political decision-making or public deliberation:
The strategy I have defended . . . largely avoids the difficulty of
administering any sharp or strong distinction between “religious” and
“nonreligious” moral premises. . . . (1) Religious argument that
survives the standard of public accessibility . . . should be admitted to
the public square no less than nonreligious, or “secular”, argument that
survives that standard, and (2) nonreligious/secular argument that fails
the standard of public accessibility should be excluded no less than
religious argument that fails the standard.37

Perry forthrightly specifies the profile of such inaccessible religious reasons:
“sectarian” appeals to authority, paradigmatically exemplified by reasons that
(putatively) depend for their normative authority on divine revelation.38 To
appeal to biblical or koranic reasons in public deliberation is to appeal to reasons
that have no authority to those outside of the Christian or Muslim community. It
is the functional equivalent of providing “outsiders” with no reason at all,
thereby excluding them from political dialogue, and so corroding the bonds of
political community. Such direct appeals to revelatory reasons, particularly
fundamentalist conceptions thereof, are disallowed in ecumenical political
dialogue, but they are by no means representative of religious reasons
generally.39
So understood, Love and Power advocates in favor of a mediating position
between a stringent restriction on all religious reasons and a lax permission to
appeal to any and all reasons, and thus to any and all religious reasons, no matter
how sectarian, dogmatic, or insular:
Ecumenical political dialogue is valuable in itself because it is a
principal constituent of a politics neither neutral/impartial nor
sectarian/authoritarian but ecumenical: a politics in which citizens
meet one another in the public square, sometimes to reach consensus,
more often to diminish dissensus, and most often, perhaps, simply to
clarify, to better understand, the nature of their disagreement, but
always to cultivate the bonds of (political) community, by reaffirming
their ties to one another, in particular their shared commitment to
certain authoritative political-moral premises.40

37
38
39
40

Id. at 111.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 125.
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Here, I take it, Perry articulates a broadly consequentialist—a communitarianconsequentialist—rationale for his favored justificatory constraints on religious
reasons: the restricted justificatory employment of inaccessible, and so
revelatory, reasons promotes political community among a diversely committed
population. This concern with revelatory reasons persists throughout Perry’s
corpus; although, as we will see, it is manifest very differently over time, from
outright exclusion to a wary permission.
III. PERRY’S MODIFIED MODERATE EXCLUSIVISM
Religion in Politics substantially revises the moderate exclusionism of Love
and Power. As I read him, Perry’s commitment to ecumenical political dialogue
retains its guiding normative role, but he alters considerably his assessment of
its implications for the justificatory role of religious reasons. It is, Perry argues,
inevitable that citizens and state officials will be influenced in their political
decision-making by their various faith commitments—whether by directly
providing reason to support some state policy or by providing reason to accept
a secular rationale that in turn grounds some state policy.41 If the influence of
religious commitment on political decision-making is inevitable, then this is a
fact with which any communitarian-consequentialist assessment of the
justificatory role of religious reasons must contend. Given this inevitability of
influence, we should urge citizens and state officials to offer up in public
deliberation all of their religious reasons so that they may be tested, assessed,
modified, or rejected. We must encourage citizens and state officials to offer
those reasons up in public deliberation to temper the influence that those reasons
have on political decision-making. This includes appeal to the kind of sectariancum-revelatory reason that Perry excludes from public deliberation in Love and
Power:
Because of the role that religiously based moral arguments inevitably
play in the political process, then, it is important that such arguments,
no less than secular moral arguments, be presented in, so that they can
be tested in, public political debate. Ideally, such arguments will
sometimes be tested, in the to and fro of public political debate, by
competing scripture- or tradition-based religious arguments.42

Bluntly put, Perry’s normative conception of ecumenical political dialogue—
genuine public deliberation between pluralistically committed citizens regarding
their common affairs—provides compelling reason to include all religious
41
42

PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 44.
Id. at 45.
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reasons in public deliberation, including “sectarian” reasons that have little
authority outside of some particular religious or moral community. Gone is the
accessibility constraint that Perry affirmed in Love and Power, as it improves
neither public deliberation nor political decision-making.
I should note that Perry’s inclusionist conception of public deliberation
extends not merely to “private” conversations between citizens, and not only to
the “quasi-public” deliberations that occur in civil society but also to the public
declarations of state officials.43 Although prominent theorists Habermas,44
Laborde,45 Gaus, and Vallier46 have claimed that state officials at least ought to
circumscribe public appeal to religious reasons, Perry demurs. If he is correct,
then “the truthful disclosure of all the reasons why an elected official stands
where she does is an overriding value.”47 Unsurprisingly, and unavoidably, there
are tradeoffs here: the truthful disclosure is a good for which “most of us citizens
of a liberal democracy would be more than willing to endure some feeling of
being ‘imposed upon.’”48 This comparative axiological assessment leads Perry
to affirm a capacious understanding of the kind of public deliberation
appropriate for state officials:
Especially because the truthful disclosure of all the reasons why an
elected official stands where she does is an overriding value, a much
more sensible way to minimize the extent to which some citizens
might “feel imposed upon in the sense of being excluded” . . . is for a
legislator to feature, in public political debate, not only all the relevant
arguments that she takes seriously, including religious arguments, but
all the credible and not otherwise inappropriate arguments that might
incline a citizen to support the political choice at issue. In that way, a
legislator does not conceal the real bases of her support, but neither
does she gratuitously marginalize or exclude reasons that might appeal
to some of her constituents or to some citizens generally; instead, she
“re-presents” all the relevant reasons, both those that are most

43

Id. at 52.
Jürgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 8–9 (2006) (“[T]he liberal state
. . . cannot . . . expect of all citizens that they also justify their political statements independently of their religious
convictions or world views. This strict demand can only be laid at the door of politicians, who within state
institutions are subject to the obligation to remain neutral in the face of competing world views; in other words
it can only be made of anyone who holds a public office or is a candidate for such.” (emphasis omitted)).
In a marked contrast to Perry’s ecumenical conception, Habermas argues that violations of this strict demand
must be expunged from the legislative record. Id. at 16.
45
LABORDE, supra note 7, at 125.
46
Gerald F. Gaus & Kevin Vallier, The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The
Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry, and Political Institutions, 35 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 51, 56 (2009).
47
PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 52.
48
Id. (emphasis omitted).
44
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important to her and those that might be most important to someone
else. She thereby cultivates the bonds of political community even as
she forthrightly indicates why she stands where she does.49

Here, I take it, Perry affirms the moral value of conscientious engagement by
the state officials who serve a diversely committed citizenry: the pursuit,
articulation, and mutual criticism of all manner of reasons, some of which a
given state official regards as dispositive, others of which she does not, but all
of which she offers to provide her compatriots with reasons that they might
regard as sufficient grounding for her favored policies.50 This kind of open,
other-directed, mutually educative, and reciprocally critical engagement is
essential to ecumenical political dialogue as Perry here understands it. It is a
highly attractive deliberative ideal, not only for citizens in civil society but also
for state officials as they carry out their public duties.
Matters are very different with respect to political decision-making. Here,
Perry sharply curtails the justificatory role that religious reasons may play.51 If
he is correct, inclusive and public deliberation improves political decisionmaking by way of enabling citizens and state officials to exercise due restraint.
How so? Briefly, after distinguishing between claims regarding human worth
and human flourishing,52 Perry advocates that religious arguments about human
flourishing are doubtful unless they enjoy independent secular corroboration:
[T]he persuasiveness or soundness of any religious argument about the
requirements of human well-being depends, or should depend, partly
on there being at least one persuasive secular argument . . . that reaches
the same conclusion about the requirements of human well-being as
the religious argument.53

All manner of state policies bear on matters of human well-being, and so
arguments thereabout will often have clear political importance. Public
deliberation makes it possible for citizens and state officials to determine
whether their favored religiously grounded claims about human well-being
enjoy persuasive secular corroboration. Should a citizen or state official discern
through public deliberation that some such claim lacks secular corroboration,
49

Id.
This is a position for which I attempted to argue some years after in two works. CHRISTOPHER J.
EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002) [hereinafter EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION];
Christopher J. Eberle, “Religious Reasons in Public Life: Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom, But Be Prepared to
Prune,” 22 ST JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431 (2007). It is humbling, and a little disconcerting, to realize now
that Perry powerfully articulated it long before I put pen to paper. . .
51
PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 72–73.
52
Id. at 66.
53
Id. at 72–73.
50
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then she should doubt it and therefore refrain from supporting or opposing any
state policy on its basis. In short, radically open, inclusive public deliberation
enables citizens and state officials to discern whether the religious reasons that
might otherwise influence their political decisions enjoy the secular
corroboration that, Perry argues, a wide swathe of religious reasons must enjoy.
Perry asserts the following:
[M]y point is not that in making a political choice . . . religious
believers ought not to rely on a religious argument about the
requirements of human well-being. My point is that they ought not to
do so unless a persuasive (to them) secular argument reaches the same
conclusion about the requirements of human well-being as the
religious argument on which they are inclined to rely.54

As Perry sees it, then, a genuinely ecumenical politics requires that citizens and
state officials adhere to a principle of restraint that precludes a wide swathe of
religious reasons from having justificatory force:
Consider what we may call the “ecumenical” function of the practice
I am recommending here. For citizens and, especially, their elected
representatives to decline to make a political choice about the morality
of human conduct unless a persuasive secular argument supports the
choice . . . helps American politics to maintain a relatively ecumenical
character rather than a sectarian one. Such a practice deemphasizes one
of the most fundamental things that divides us—religion—and in that
sense and to that extent is one way of cultivating, rather than fraying,
the bonds of political community.55

IV. PERRY’S CRITICAL INCLUSIONISM
Perry arrives at his most inclusive destination in Under God?, a work in
which the radical openness to religious contributions in public deliberation for
which Perry argued in Religion in Politics is extended to political decisionmaking as well. He reaches this expansive destination by travelling at least two
ecumenical routes. We are already familiar with the first: Perry assesses various
proposals regarding the justificatory role of religious reasons by whether a given
proposal cultivates rather than frays the bonds of political community.56 As I see
it, the broadly consequentialist-communitarian content of his main arguments
helps to explain his movement towards inclusionism. A liberal polity that is as
religiously vibrant as the United States will inevitably splinter into “sectarian”
54
55
56

Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 78–79.
See supra Part II.
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disagreement about just which principles of restraint foster a genuinely
ecumenical political community thereabout. Any restriction on religious reasons
with real bite is therefore likely to be just as divisive, alienating, or corrosive of
community as the lack of such a restriction and so is likely to engender the very
kind of social and political dysfunctions that it is supposed to prevent.57 In short,
communitarian arguments in favor of exclusionary restraints on religious
reasons are bound to lack purchase in liberal polities, like the United States, that
are populated by large numbers of citizens and state officials who care deeply
about living with faithfulness to God in public life. Hence, we have Perry’s everweakening constraints on the manner in which believers may employ religious
reasons in public.
This trajectory continues in Under God?. As I read him, Perry reframes the
communitarian considerations on which he long placed great weight by
incorporating them into a broader, ecumenical understanding of what makes for
a liberal democracy.58 This is his second ecumenical route to inclusionism, one
that begins at “the heart of the morality of liberal democracy.”59 Some of us are
religious, others secular; some conservative, others progressive; some pro-life,
others pro-choice; some optimistic about the possibilities of good government,
others quite pessimistic. But Perry insists on the following:
We Americans are all liberals now, because we all affirm the true and
full humanity of every person, without regard to race, sex, religion,
and so on, and we also affirm, therefore, certain basic human freedoms
(e.g., the freedoms of speech, press, and religion). It is this twofold
affirmation that makes a democracy a “liberal” democracy, a political
morality a “liberal” political morality, and a person a “liberal.”60

Perry employs this minimalistic conception of the morality of liberal democracy
to reframe his assessment of the justificatory role of religious reasons. Rather
than attempting to discern which restrictions on religious reasons promote the
bonds of political community, Perry asks whether the two claims at the heart of
the morality of liberal democracy entail, imply, or even so much as slightly
support general, stringent restrictions on the justificatory role of religious
reasons.61
57
So, for example, as I noted in Part III above, Perry argues in Religion in Politics that the soundness of
a religious argument about human well-being depends on there being at least one persuasive secular argument
to the same conclusion. See supra Part III. Whatever else we might say about Perry’s argument (and in my case,
there is a great deal), this is at the very least an intensely controversial rationale for a principle of restraint.
58
PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 37.
59
Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).
60
Id. at 37.
61
Id. at 38.
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They do in fact ground two important justificatory constraints. Perry’s aim
is to articulate a defensible conception of the proper role of religious reasons in
a liberal democracy.62 In articulating that conception, we may take as given
moral claims that lie at the normative heart of a liberal democracy. As noted,
there are two such claims—to the inherent dignity of each human being and to
certain rights grounded thereupon. We may therefore insist that citizens and state
officials rely in political decision-making and public deliberation on no reason
that denies that inherent worth of any human being, and they ought to rely on no
reason that denies certain basic rights, including the right to religious freedom.63
Each of these constraints applies broadly—they constrain the justificatory role
of any reason, religious or secular. They serve as a thin substantive filter through
which any reason must pass to have justificatory force. Even so, they lack
justificatory bite: the vast majority of religious reasons are compatible with the
two claims that constitute the moral core of liberal democracy and so neither
constraint as applied would forbid citizens and state officials from according
justificatory weight to religious reasons on which that they might otherwise be
inclined to rely.
This naturally raises the question: is there any reason to adopt more
demanding, and so more exclusive, restrictions? Not directly. We can see this
by reflecting on the content of the two norms that Perry locates at the moral heart
of liberal democracy: on any non-tendentious rendering thereof, it is obvious
that neither a commitment to human dignity nor to the basic rights grounded on
human dignity directly imply any demanding justificatory constraints on
religious reasons.64 And so Perry concludes, “Nothing in the morality of liberal
democracy—nothing in either of liberal democracy’s two constitutive
commitments—supports the claim that it is illegitimate for religious believers to
introduce religiously grounded moral belief into public political argument.”65
Similarly, one might assume the following for political decision-making:
Nothing either in the commitment to the true and full humanity of
every person or in the allied commitment to certain basic human
freedoms forbids legislators . . . to disfavor conduct on the basis of a

62

Id. at 38–39.
Perry writes that “[i]t is never for one to show respect for another for him to offer her—for example,
for a Nazi to offer to a Jew—an explanation to the effect that ‘You are not truly or fully human’ . . . . [T]he set
of moral beliefs on which government may base a political choice is limited.” Id. at 48–49.
64
Id. at 38–39.
65
Id.
63
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religiously grounded moral belief just in virtue of the fact that the
belief is religiously grounded.66

So, it seems that there is at least presumptive reason to affirm a very wide
inclusionism: if we accept Perry’s minimalist conception of what makes for the
morality of liberal democracy, then it is plausible to conclude that liberalism by
itself implies only the most minimal, lax constraints on the justificatory role that
religious reasons may play in political decision-making or in public deliberation.
Of course, presumptions can be overridden—and so there might, in principle, be
some further rationale in favor of more robust restrictions on the justificatory
role of religious reasons. Even if we cannot read exclusionist constraints into
core liberal norms, is there some more indirect dialectical route to a robust
general constraint on religious reasons?
The burden of Perry’s argument in Under God? is that there is no such
rationale. His reasons for rejecting restrictions on religious reasons in public
deliberation are familiar. Here, as in Religion in Politics, Perry argues that the
inclusion of religious reasons in public deliberation improves political decisionmaking: citizens and state officials will inevitably be influenced in their political
decision-making by religious reasons; it is, therefore, particularly important that
those religious reasons be critically assessed. So, “we should not merely
welcome but encourage the presentation of such [religious] belief in public
political argument—so that we can test it there.”67 I should note, however, that
Perry now articulates this argument in a way that helps to ground a most
important justificatory principle, viz., a commitment to the equal treatment of
religious and secular reasons. Perry argues that we should welcome religious
belief into political deliberation not merely because we need to test religious
convictions that inevitably (yet, we might think, regretfully) influence political
decision-making but also because we might have something of genuine value to
learn from such religious contributions: “We should also, in the course of testing
such beliefs, let ourselves be tested by them. In a political community that
aspires to be not merely democratic but deliberatively democratic, there is surely
virtue in allowing ourselves to be tested by positions with which, at the outset,
we disagree.”68 There is an important parity here: secular citizens have as much
to learn from religious citizens as religious citizens have to learn from secular
citizens. So it is that we have excellent grounds for encouraging all citizens to

66
67
68

Id. at 46. Perry will later dissent from this judgment. See infra Conclusion.
Id. at 43 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
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articulate in public the reasons, religious or secular, that they take to support
their favored state policies.
Perry repeatedly drives this parity claim home: the “intrusion” of religious
conviction into public political argument can be divisive, to be sure, but it need
not be more so than the “intrusion” of secular conviction.69 Again, religious
arguments can be sectarian, but they can also be far less sectarian than their
secular counterparts.70 Once again, religious citizens can be less deliberative
than secular citizens, but they need not be.71 And so on. Given the moral
importance of our shared participation in ecumenical political dialogue, and
given that there are no morally relevant differences between religious and
secular contributions to such dialogue, there is good reason to reject the
admonition of those, like Richard Rorty, who aspire to make “it seem bad taste
to bring religion into discussions of public policy.”72 It is not the case that any
and all religious reasons are deliberatively defective conversation-stoppers, as
Rorty avers. At least, they need be no more so than are all manner of secular
reasons. Parity between the religious and the secular with respect to the manner
in which they contribute to ecumenical political dialogue implies parity with
respect to the justificatory principles that regulate the role that religious and
secular reasons may play in public deliberation.
But what about political decision-making? Perry affirms the expansively
inclusionist claim that citizens and state officials in liberal democracies may
make political decisions absent any corroboratory secular rationale, so long as
their deciding rationale is consistent with the claims that each and every human
being enjoys inherent worth and that each thereby enjoys a certain spread of
rights.73 How does he reach that conclusion, so different than his earlier claim
that a broad swathe of religious reasons must enjoy secular corroboration? As I
noted above, reflection on the core, minimal content of liberal democracy
indicates a presumption in favor of a very expansive inclusionism, one that
permits citizens and state officials to rely in political decision-making and public
deliberation on any dignity- and rights-respecting religious reason. If no
arguments overcome that presumption, then we should affirm a very wide
inclusionism with respect to religious reasons. This frames Perry’s discussion of
the proper role of religious reasons in political decision-making: he assesses the
69
70
71
72

Id. at 40.
See id. at 40–41.
See id. at 42.
RICHARD RORTY, Religion as a Conversation Stopper, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 168, 169

(1999).
73

PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 51.
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available arguments and concludes that none is sufficiently compelling to
overcome the presumption in favor of a dignity- and rights-cabined
inclusionism.74 Perry focuses his dialectical attention on one of the most
important of such arguments, viz., the argument from respect. As noted above,
one of the core claims of liberal democratic morality is that every person, and so
each and every citizen, enjoys equal, inherent dignity. To impose a law on our
fellow citizens that depends for its justification on some religious rationale is to
fail to accord our compatriots the respect that is due them as our equals.75 Hence,
citizens and state officials ought not to decide to support any state policy that
depends for its justification on some religious rationale. To do otherwise, is “to
deny to those persons the respect that is their due as persons—or, as John Rawls
has put it, as ‘free and equal’ persons.”76
Perry is most skeptical of this argument. His skepticism seems to me to be
grounded on his understanding that those who make political decisions on
religious grounds can respect their compatriots by the manner in which they
engage with their compatriots—and more precisely, by engaging in ecumenical
political dialogue:
[R]espect counsels not only that we offer others, as explanation, what
we take to be our best reasons for acting as we do, but also that we try
to discern and then communicate to them whatever reason or reasons
they might have for supporting . . . the law or policy at issue.77

Somewhat more expansively, he writes the following:
It is altogether obscure why we do not show others the respect that is
their due, first, “when we offer them, as explanation, what we take to
be our best reasons for acting as we do” (so long as our reasons do not
assert, presuppose, or entail the inferior humanity of those to whom
the explanation is offered) and, second, when we try (even if in the end
we fail) to discern and communicate other reasons that might win their
consent, or at least diminish their hostility, to the law or policy at
issue.78

If I understand him correctly, Perry here implicitly denies that we should sharply
distinguish between what makes for respectful political decision-making and
respectful public deliberation. How we arrive at and communicate with others
about our favored political decisions manifests our respect, or the lack thereof,
74
75
76
77
78

See id. at 46–49 (assessing the arguments from respect and divisiveness).
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. (quoting EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION, supra note 50, at 48 n.40).
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for our compatriots. Whether our reliance on religious reasons treats our
compatriots with due respect is a function of myriad distinct ways in which we
treat our fellow human beings—whether we care for their well-being, think them
worthy of genuinely dialogical engagement, open ourselves to their objections
to our dearest convictions, offer them reasons that we hope will lead them to
support our favored state policies, and so on. Otherwise put, those who
genuinely engage in Perry’s inclusionist ecumenical political dialogue need not
disrespect their compatriots even if they end up deciding to support coercive
state policies on the basis of “sectarian” or even revelatory, grounds.
So it is that Perry’s quest for an ecumenical politics leads him to a radically
inclusive destination in Under God?: citizens and state officials are free to make
political decisions and to engage in public deliberation on the basis of any
comprehensible dignity- and rights-respecting religious reason that they
conscientiously take to be correct. Should some coalition of citizens and
legislators have enough political clout to enact some state policy on the basis of
religious reasons that satisfy that profile, then there need be nothing morally
problematic with that result—even if there exists no plausible or persuasive
secular corroboration thereof. Such a state of affairs need not run athwart the
normative aspiration that most centrally guides Perry’s scholarly reflections on
the justificatory role of religious reasons—respectful, ecumenical political
dialogue. Here is Perry reflecting in retrospect on the driving force behind his
various scholarly peregrinations:
I first addressed the subject of religion in politics in my book Love and
Power; I sketched there the ideal of “ecumenical politics,” which, as I
explained, comprised both ecumenical political dialogue and
ecumenical political tolerance. As I have noted more than once in this
book, I have abandoned the exclusionism I defended in Love and
Power. Nonetheless, ecumenical politics still seems to me the right
ideal for those in the United States—indeed, in any liberal
democracy—who would bring their religion to bear on their politics.
The mirror image of ecumenical politics is sectarian politics. Sectarian
politics is precisely the wrong ideal.79

In short, Perry’s commitment to an ecumenical rather than a sectarian politics
remains constant as he gradually arrives at the conclusion that the least sectarian
and most respectful politics available to us is one that eschews the kind of
general, exclusive constraints on religious reasons that have been endorsed by
so many other theorists—and by Perry early on in his quest.

79

Id. at 128.
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V. A BRIEF EXCURSUS ON LABORDE’S “LIBERALISM’S RELIGION”
Let me pause here to discuss the bearing of Perry’s arguments on one recent
discussion of the justificatory role of religious reasons, viz., Cécile Laborde’s
Liberalism’s Religion.80 I do so for at least three reasons. First, Laborde’s work
on that topic is terrific: she articulates a plausible conception of liberalism and
its justificatory constraints that is more than worthy of careful attention and
critical engagement. Second, Perry and Laborde share an aspiration to articulate
and defend a conception of liberalism that is amenable to the robust presence of
religion in the public life of liberal democracies. Indeed, in my judgment, the
extent to which Laborde is willing to welcome religious contributions in public
life is refreshingly generous and quite unusual.81 Third, Laborde nevertheless
affirms a justificatory constraint that applies to a broad swathe of religious
reasons, viz., that state officials may not rely on publicly inaccessible reasons in
political decision-making or advocacy.82 As I noted earlier, Perry once affirmed
a version of that ‘public accessibility’ constraint but subsequently concluded that
it “does not survive careful scrutiny.”83 So there is an important difference of
justificatory principle between the two. As I see it, the shared excellence, the
commonality of normative aspiration, and the difference in justificatory
principle renders an assessment of Laborde’s work in a Festschrift honoring
Perry particularly appropriate. My intention is to articulate reasons why Laborde
should follow Perry in leaving behind her public accessibility constraint.
One of Laborde’s primary aspirations is to ascertain the “minimal secular
core of liberal democracy.”84 A critical component of that secular core is an
“epistemic standard[]” through which any and all reasons must pass if they are
to have justificatory force.85 Laborde argues that a necessary condition of a
reason’s having justificatory force is that it has the property of being
accessible.86 If a reason lacks that property, if it is inaccessible, then no state
official may rely on that reason in political decision-making or public
deliberation.87 So Laborde explains the following:
80
81

LABORDE, supra note 7.
See id. at 151–52 (depicting “Divinitia,” an ideal typical liberal democracy awash in a sea of public

faith).
82

See LABORDE, supra note 7, at 163.
PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 124.
84
LABORDE, supra note 7, at 116.
85
Id. at 120.
86
Id.
87
I should note that Laborde takes her accessibility constraint to bind only state officials, not ordinary
citizens, even when the latter engage in public deliberation in civil society: “Because they have representative
obligations . . . and because state acts are particularly coercive, public officials . . . are under an obligation of
83
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[S]tate-proffered reasons for laws must be articulated in a language
that members of the public can understand and engage with. There are
epistemic constraints on the inputs into public debate . . . Official
justification by the state should not appeal to reasons that actual
citizens find inaccessible: that they cannot understand and discuss as
reasons. The epistemic theory of public reason explains the widely
shared intuition that state officials should not appeal to divine will or
to personal revelation to justify exercising coercion on all. This is not,
I submit, simply because people disagree about whether such sources
are authoritative or not. People, after all, reasonably disagree about
many things . . Instead, I submit, some reasons are problematic in
public justification because they lack some basic epistemic quality:
they are not accessible to common reason.88

What does it mean for a reason to be accessible in the respect required for it to
have justificatory force for a state official? When it can be assessed by others in
light of widely shared normative standards: an accessible reason “can be
understood and assessed, but need not be endorsed according to common
standards”;89 it “can be assessed and evaluated publicly”;90 citizens generally
“can understand and engage with” it;91 they “can engage with and continue to
criticize” it;92 and so on. So, an accessible reason is assessable by others.
For example, suppose that A takes reason R as dispositive support for some
state policy. If R is accessible, then others must be in a position to evaluate R in
light of shared normative standards and so to determine whether R merits their
assent. To be sure, R can be assessable by others without its being positively
assessed: the fact that R can be assessed in light of common epistemic standards,
that it has been assessed, and that it has been found wanting perhaps even in
some crucial respect, does not thereby render R inaccessible.93 In short, the
justificatory filter through which any reason R must pass is not whether others
affirm R, much less that others concur in the judgment that R vindicates the

restraint when they publicly justify their actions and policies. No such obligation falls on ordinary citizens. . . .”
Id. at 125. I will not here assess this aspect of her minimal secularism, other than to note that Perry compellingly
objects to an earlier formulation of this position (as articulated by Kent Greenawalt) in his Religion in Politics.
See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 49–54. As I see it, the central issue of principle is which
justificatory constraints apply to political decision-making and public deliberation, not who has to abide by those
constraints—citizens, legislators, judges, military officers, and so on.
88
LABORDE, supra note 7, at 119–20.
89
Id. at 120.
90
Id. at 123.
91
Id. at 129.
92
Id. at 122.
93
Otherwise put, accessible reasons need not be endorsed by others and so need not be shared reasons.
See id. at 120.
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target policy, but that R can be evaluated in light of shared normative standards.
This, Laborde says, is necessary if we are to respect one another as democratic
reasoners.94
Laborde’s accessibility constraint allows for a differentiated—or as Laborde
says, a “disaggregated”—assessment of the justificatory role of religious
reasons.95 Religious reasons are not “uniquely special” with respect to their
justificatory status: Laborde’s accessibility constraint does not single out
religious reasons for distinctive, discriminatory treatment.96 It is not the case that
all and only religious reasons count as inaccessible: not only is it the case that
some secular reasons are inaccessible but it is also the case that some religious
reasons are accessible. So, for example, “natural theology arguments . . . can be
assessed on their own merits, by reference to ordinary criteria of rationality” and
so count as accessible.97 Both the religious and the secular are internally
differentiated: distinct kinds of religious and secular reason possess importantly
different epistemic, moral, and sociological properties, so we cannot assess “the”
justificatory role of religious reasons as such any more than we can assess “the”
justificatory role of secular reasons as such. Much to the contrary, we need to
identify the particular properties of distinct kinds of religious and secular reason
and accord them differential justificatory weight in light of their distinctive
epistemic and substantive profiles.
Laborde’s differentiated, disaggregative assessment of the justificatory role
of religious reasons does not comport well with the most extreme versions of
exclusionism—those that target all religious reasons with highly stringent
restrictions. After all, the internal differentiation of both the religious and the
secular virtually guarantees that at least some religious reasons will flow through
any epistemic filter porous enough to allow a sufficiently robust range of secular
reasons to enter the justificatory pool. That said, Laborde’s disaggregative
assessment is compatible with stringent constraints on particular kinds of
religious reason. And so it is that Laborde understands her favored justificatory
constraint to preclude reliance on a very important category of religious
reason—revelatory reasons. Laborde writes, “A state that makes laws on the
basis of the ethical truths contained in a sacred text is in breach of the
accessibility condition (nonbelievers and dissidents cannot debate the reasons

94

See id. at 122.
See, e.g., id. at 2, 130.
96
Id. at 125.
97
Cécile Laborde, On the Parity Between Religious and Secular Reasons, 47 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 575,
585 (2021).
95
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for the laws).”98 Not all religious reasons are “unsuitable to democratic
deliberation,” but many are—most particularly those that are “intelligible
exclusively by reference to the source of their authority []if they only appeal to
a personal experience of revelation, or to extra-human sources of authority.”99
In short, although it is not the case that all religious reasons count as inaccessible
and so lack justificatory force, it is the case that all revelatory reasons count as
inaccessible and so lack justificatory force. If Laborde is correct, then no state
official may rely on revelatory reasons either in political decision-making or
public deliberation.
There is a great deal to admire in Laborde’s disaggregative approach of the
proper public role of religion in liberal polities, not least that it enables her to
disassociate liberal democracy from the invidious construal of religious reasons
that so often seem to me to drive the work of those who incline towards
exclusionist constraints. A great many theorists have claimed, or merely
assumed, that “religious reasons as such are subject to constraints that do not
apply to all secular reasons: at least some secular reasons possess a justificatory
potential that any and all religious reasons lack.”100 This kind of symmetry is
deeply embedded in a great deal of contemporary political theory. Moreover, I
believe that reliance on this kind of asymmetry—which often, even if
unintentionally, trades on one or another invidious contrast between the religious
and the secular—accounts for a great deal of the antipathy that many religious
citizens discern in the work of liberal theorists. Fortunately, it is not embedded
in Laborde’s work. She quite clearly affirms what so many liberal political
theorists deny, viz., that there is no compelling reason for liberals to privilege
secular reasons over religious reasons in public deliberation or political
decision-making, and certainly not because religious reasons are epistemically
or morally defective in ways that secular reasons are not.
That said, I believe that there is excellent reason for Laborde to relax even
further her already expansive understanding of her favored justificatory
constraint. More particularly, I believe that we can espy in Perry’s work
powerful reason for Laborde to disaggregate further: not only do religious
reasons generally exhibit crucially different moral, epistemic, and sociological
properties so also do revelatory reasons possess importantly different moral,
epistemic, and sociological properties. Perry provides excellent reason to deny

98

LABORDE, supra note 7, at 150.
Id. at 127.
100
See, e.g., Christopher J. Eberle, Irreconcilable Disagreement: Supreme Emergency, Respect, and
Restraint, 47 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 457, 469 (2021).
99
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that revelatory reasons cannot be assessed in light of common critical standards,
ordinary standards of rationality, or the like. Even though Perry early on
endorsed an understanding of the accessibility constraint that has precisely that
application, and even though he has been persistently wary of those who appeal
to revelatory reasons in political decision-making and public deliberation,101 he
does in fact provide excellent reason to reject Laborde’s blanket prohibition
thereof. Doing so would eliminate what I take to be one component of Laborde’s
minimal secularism that assumes the kind of invidious construal of religion that
so often mars the work of liberal political theorists and thus would enable
Laborde better to achieve her aim of articulating a conception of liberalism that
accords even-handed treatment to both the religious and the secular.
Let me return to the Michael Perry of Under God?. Whereas the first half of
Under God? comprises his case in favor of an expansive inclusionism (as
discussed above), its second half has a very different focus. It turns out that
Perry’s inclusionism has what we might find an unexpected result: his openness
to ever greater religious contributions to political decision-making and public
deliberation correlated with his ever more critical attention to the merits and
demerits of specific religious arguments.102 To reject exclusionary constraints
on religious reasons is by no means to accord justificatory weight to any and
every particular religious reason. Much to the contrary, those who reject general,
stringent restrictions on religious reasons may without the slightest incoherence
lodge piecemeal, particularized objections to specific religious reasons. And so
it is that the second half of Under God? is replete with admonitions to citizens
and public officials to reflect critically and warily on all manner of particular
religious reasons. It is as if Perry’s generalized openness to religious
contributions to public life impels him to assess the specific arguments that
citizens and state officials employ. In short, if all are allowed, then each must be
assessed. As a consequence, Perry subjects to critical assessment various
arguments regarding abortion and homosexuality—two political issues with
respect to which religious arguments have often played a prominent justificatory
role. As Perry notes, to discuss the proper public role of religious reasons absent
attention to political disputes about abortion and homosexuality is akin to
staging Hamlet absent the prince.103

101
See, e.g., PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 55 (exploring the claim that Christian theology
motivates Christians to be wary of relying on certain religious reasons in political decision-making).
102
PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 55–123.
103
Id. at 98.
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Consider in this regard Perry’s discussion of homosexuality.104 Perry
assesses various “secular” arguments in support of the claim that homosexual
relations are in some important respect morally objectionable. He concludes that
none are sound. He acknowledges, however, that there remain any number of
religious arguments in support of that claim. Most particularly, he addresses
those who believe that the Bible is an authoritative source of moral truth and
who also believe that the Bible teaches that homosexual relations are morally
improper.105 The burden of Perry’s argument, as I read it, is to persuade religious
believers so committed both to reassess their convictions about homosexuality
and to recognize that such reassessment comports well with their deepest
theological commitments. That is, it belongs to the religious commitments of
those who rely on biblical arguments to grant that their own interpretations of
the Bible can be addled by sin, corrupted by culture, or distorted by inordinate
desire; so, they have reason internal to their own religious tradition to check their
interpretations of the Bible in the light of any reliable source of evidence,
including moral reasons known independently of the Bible.106 Moreover,
powerful intra- and extra-biblical reasons count against the claim that
homosexual relations are morally objectionable. There are, therefore, powerful
reasons for those who affirm biblical authority to rethink and revise their
biblically grounded objections to homosexual relations, not least moral
arguments articulated by those who deny that God exists, disavow the divine
authorship of the Bible, or anything of the sort. So, Perry explains the following:
If contemporary human experience does indeed disclose that same-sex
unions can be truly, deeply fulfilling for some persons, this constitutes
a powerful reason, for Christians who believe that whatever the Bible
teaches about human well-being is true, to doubt that the Bible really
teaches that homosexual sexual conduct is always immoral.107

In short, reliance on revelatory reasons to ground an assessment of
homosexuality is not only consistent with but also comports nicely with a
commitment to reassess those revelatory reasons in light of any reliable source
of knowledge—in Perry’s preferred case, the witness of contemporary human
experience.
As I see it, Perry’s reflections on biblical arguments regarding homosexuality
exemplify in detail a broader truth with clear implications for Laborde’s
assessment of the justificatory force of revelatory reasons: it is not the case that
104
105
106
107

See id. at 55–97.
See id. at 55–85.
See id. at 77.
Id. at 73.
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revelatory reasons as such are not amenable to critical assessment in light of
commonly shared standards. That is a misimpression that Perry expertly
deconstructs as he engages in his piecemeal, case-by-case assessment of
biblically grounded arguments regarding homosexuality. He demonstrates in
concrete detail that none of us need to stand mute, uncomprehending, or
excluded from critical engagement in the face of biblically grounded arguments
in favor of controversial political decisions.108 Moreover, this is generally the
case. If God reveals to me, in the privacy of my conscience, that there is an
elephant in the room in which you and I are both seated, then you are more than
capable of providing me with reason to conclude that something has gone awry
with my apprehension of God in this case. This is just to say that my “private
revelation” can be assessed in the light of ordinary criteria of rationality: modus
ponens and everyday sense perception in this case.109 If I think that the Bible
reveals that the world was created less than ten thousand years ago, then that
revelatory claim can be assessed in light of the best scientific knowledge now
on offer.110 If I insist that God reveals that we are under an exceptionless duty
not to intentionally target innocent human beings and therefore reject any state
policy that targets innocents with military violence, even in a supreme
emergency, then that argument assumes that there is some normatively critical
distinction between intending evil and foreseeing evil—an assumption that is the
subject of an enormous critical literature among diversely committed

108

Id. at 55–85.
There are many complexities here, which I addressed some time ago. See generally, e.g., Christopher
J. Eberle, Liberalism and Mysticism, 13 J.L. & RELIGION 189 (1998) (evaluating various epistemic restrictions
on religious reasons in light of William Alston’s defense of the rationality of mystical perception); Christopher
J. Eberle, The Autonomy and Explanation of Mystical Perception, 34 RELIGIOUS STUD. 299 (1998) (defending
the claim that religious experience should not be assessed in light of exactly the same standards as senseperceptual experience); Christopher J. Eberle, God’s Nature and the Rationality of Religious Belief, 14 FAITH &
PHIL. 152 (1997) (defending the claim that the nature of God constrains the manner in which it is rational to
assess belief about God). None of these complexities render appeal to divine revelation—whether experiential
or as encoded in written texts—resistant to assessment in light of commonly shared normative standards. Indeed,
it is a central part of my argument that they are amenable to such assessment. Were it not so, then they would
not count as rationally formed. In this, I follow several epistemologists, including William Alston, Alvin
Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, among others. I discuss the relevance of their epistemological views to
related questions most recently in Christopher J. Eberle, Religion and Insularity: Brian Leiter on
Accommodating Religion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 977 (2014) [hereinafter Eberle, Religion and Insularity]. Most
particularly, I show that there is no salvaging Brian Leiter’s assertion that “[r]eligious beliefs, in virtue of being
based on ‘faith,’ are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification, the ones we employ
in both common sense and in science.” Id. at 988 (quoting BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 34 (2013)).
110
Compare PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 77 (citing Mark Noll and George Marsden's argument
that biblical interpretation about human origins requires reliance on 'external' epistemic resources), with
LABORDE, supra note 7, at 278 n.20 (arguing that biblical claims about human origins are epistemically
inaccessible).
109
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theorists.111 Indeed, any revelatory reason can be assessed in light of common
critical standards: every revelatory reason presupposes that God exists, the claim
that God exists is the subject of an extensive critical literature that relies on
commonly held logical and epistemic principles, and so, every revelatory reason
can be assessed by any human being, theist or otherwise, in accordance with
ordinary standards of assessment.112 And on and on. There just is no respect in
which revelational reasons, considered merely as such, are not amenable to
assessment by others in light of commonly shared standards of assessment.
Of course, there might well be some religious believers who refuse to assess
their favored revelatory reasons in light of certain common standards. But that
is a contingent fact about those individuals, not a property of their reasons.
Again, there might be some revelatory reasons that are insulated from critical
assessment by the ordinary canons of rational belief-governance.113 But I can
see no reason to believe that this is invariably, or even ordinarily, the case. It is
worth emphasizing that there is a robust scholarly literature that bears on
precisely this question.114 And the burden of much of this literature is to show
that revelatory reasons satisfy ordinary canons of rationality. For obvious
reasons, those who take such reasons seriously want to show that revelatory
reasons, which are a critical source for many of their most important theological
convictions, not only can be but must be assessed in light of well-established
111
This is a case I discuss in Eberle, supra note 100. I here refer to Elizabeth Anscombe’s reflections on
the relation between the doctrine of double effect and absolute moral prohibitions. Id. at 460.
112
Consider just one subtheme in the literature—the so-called “evidential problem of evil.” It is clear the
main participants in that discussion attempt to articulate shared epistemic criteria regarding how rational agents
respond to their inability to discern God’s reasons for allowing certain cases of horrendous evil. See Stephen
John Wykstra, Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil, in THE EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT FROM EVIL 126, 126, 130
(Daniel Howard-Snyder ed., 1996); William L. Rowe, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, in
THE EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT FROM EVIL, supra, at 1, 1; William L. Rowe, The Evidential Argument from Evil:
A Second Look, in THE EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT FROM EVIL, supra¸ at 262, 262.
113
The following indicates what a parody of religious argument this concern involves:

For example, . . . Perkin . . . might adhere to a strange theological system according to which God
demands that His followers support a flat tax, and he might simply refuse to consider any
alternatives . . . . God says it, that settles it, and Perkin therefore will not consider even the
slightest progressivity. But I see no reason to believe that Perkin is characteristic of religious
believers. . .
Eberle, Religion and Insularity, supra note 109, at 1013. Nor do I see any reason to believe that reliance on
revelatory reasons must, or typically does, involve anything “akin to Perkin’s fideistic commitment to
confiscatory equality.” Id.; see also NIGEL BIGGAR, BEHAVING IN PUBLIC: HOW TO DO CHRISTIAN ETHICS 65–
67 (2011) (arguing on theological grounds that there ought be no sheer appeals to divine authority in public
conversations including a diversely committed audience).
114
See, e.g., NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, DIVINE DISCOURSE: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
CLAIM THAT GOD SPEAKS 206–07 (1995) (arguing that interpreting Biblical texts requires us to apply basic tests
of consistency).

EBERLE_6.22.22

1424

6/23/2022 11:54 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1397

philosophical truths, empirical claims about human history, moral reasons about
human sexuality, and the like. Now it might be that their arguments are entirely
wrongheaded. But this would at the very least require some defensible
conception of rational belief-governance, and some decisive argument that
revelatory reasons cannot be rationally governed in the required way. I do not
believe that Laborde even attempts to provide that argument.
There is much more to be said by way of assessing Laborde’s appeal to
accessibility as a basis for denying justificatory status to revelatory reasons and
certainly more to be said about her broader effort to identify and defend the
minimal secular core of liberal democracy. Although I intend to say more in due
course, I cannot do so here. So, let me conclude this brief discussion by noting
that the objection that I have articulated to Laborde’s views provides the basis
for a friendly amendment. How so? Laborde follows many other liberal theorists
in denying that liberalism trades on invidious stereotypes about religion: her
understanding of the proper political role of religion does “not rely on antireligious prejudice nor on the view that religious belief is irrational.”115 There is
excellent reason for this position: restraints on religious reasons are supposed to
enable a diversely committed population to “‘get along’” with one another, and
they cannot serve this purpose if they depend on the claim that the most
important convictions of the religious components of the population are a tissue
of irrationality. But Laborde’s articulation of her accessibility constraint seems
to have something like that implication. And Perry’s objection provides a way
for Laborde to revise her conception of liberalism so as to avoid it. How so?
Too bluntly put, Laborde’s claim that revelatory reasons are inaccessible
implies that all manner of religious convictions—formed by several billions of
religious believers the world over—are irrational. Although this implication
does not apply to all religious beliefs, such as religious claims grounded in
“natural theology,” it certainly applies to those grounded on some interpretation
of the Bible, Koran, or Torah. Why does Laborde’s conception of public
accessibility have that implication? If the reasons that I derive from the Bible
cannot be assessed “by reference to ordinary criteria of rationality,” as Laborde
avers, then in virtue of what might they count as rationally formed?116 On what
coherent and otherwise defensible conception of rational belief-governance
could it be the case that reasons that are not assessable in light of common
epistemic standards, or the ordinary criteria of rationality—even so—count as
rationally formed? The claim that a revelatory reason is not assessable by
115
116

Laborde, supra note 97, at 576–77.
Id. at 585.
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reference to ordinary criteria of rationality is mysterious enough; there is an
indefinitely large number of revelatory reasons that seem clearly to be assessable
in light of commonly shared standards—consistency with obviously correct
moral truths, coherence with well-established and empirically verified facts
about the human condition, compliance with the canons of formal and informal
inference, compatibility with core liberal norms, and the like. But to that
mystery, we must add the further mystery that a reason that is not assessable by
reference to the ordinary criteria of rationality might nevertheless be rationally
formed. This seems incredible.
Of course, Laborde could bite the bullet and deny that revelatory reasons are
rationally formed. In so doing, she would incorporate into her conception of
minimal liberalism a most controversial claim about the epistemic status of a
whole class of very important religious reasons—one that applies to revelatory
reasons, irrespective of whether any state official decides to rely on those
reasons in public deliberation or decision-making. It is a claim that many
religious believers will find utterly unacceptable. It will, reasonably, verify their
suspicion that liberalism does harbor invidious assessments of religious
conviction. I cannot see that this serves the overall aims of Laborde’s minimal
secularism. The best course, as I see it, is to follow the position that Perry so
elegantly developed in Under God?: replace all general, stringent, exclusionary
restraints on religious reasons with substantive restrictions (to dignity and the
rights grounded thereon) and then engage in a case-by-case analysis of particular
religious reasons, whether revelatory or otherwise.117
A CRITICAL CONCLUSION: PERRY’S EXCLUSIVIST INCLUSIONISM
I will conclude by assessing what I take to be Perry’s most recent
understanding of the justificatory role of religious reasons. In The Political
Morality of Liberal Democracy, he argues that no liberal democracy may enact
any coercive or discriminatory law for which there exists a religious, but no
plausible secular, rationale.118 This is a somewhat surprising destination, given
117
See generally PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4 (arguing in favor of a case-by-case assessment of
particular religious contributions to public deliberation and decision-making).
118
As I read it, Perry’s position in A Global Political Morality reinforces but does not differ from, or
develop further, his understanding of the moral constraints on the justificatory role of religious reasons as
articulated in The Political Morality of Liberal Democracy. Compare PERRY, GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY,
supra note 6, at 63–87 (arguing that political legitimacy in a liberal democracy precludes government from
banning conduct on the basis of a sectarian belief that such conduct is immoral), with PERRY, POLITICAL
MORALITY, supra note 1, at 100–99 (arguing that the morality of liberal democracy precludes state laws for
which the only plausible rationale is religious). I should note again that I am interested only in what the morality
of liberal democracy implies for the justificatory role of religious reasons, not the more particular commitments
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that it targets religious reasons as such, and so follows a very different trajectory
than Perry’s earlier work. That said, this justificatory constraint is, plausibly, one
that falls near the inclusionist end of the spectrum of possibilities. How can that
be? The requirement that a law must have a plausible secular rationale will
almost always be satisfied, at least for any law that has a realistic chance of being
enacted in an actual liberal democracy, such as the United States: for any law
that citizens or state officials might actually be willing to support on religious
grounds, there will almost invariably be some plausible secular rationale. Perry
grants that it might have restrictive implications for laws that bear on sexual
morality, such as laws having to do with same-sex marriage.119 Other than that,
the limits it imposes on actual citizens or state officials are nugatory.120 This
seems to me a defensible view, although that depends on what we mean by a
“plausible” secular reason and whether we remain satisfied with that plausibility
qualification.121 If we replace it with some more stringent variant (for example,
the more demanding “persuasive secular corroboration” constraint for which
Perry argued, on very different grounds, in Religion in Politics), then the
aforementioned justificatory constraint will be that much more exclusionary.122
However that might be, the issue remains: Why should we accept a constraint
that requires state laws to be justified by plausible secular reasons, even should
that constraint lack practical effect?
In The Political Morality of Liberal Democracy, Perry extends a line of
argument which he employed to good effect in Under God?. As we saw, Perry
specifies two moral claims that constitute the normative core of a liberal
democracy, viz., that each human being has inherent dignity and thereby enjoys
a certain spread of basic rights, not least a right to religious freedom. Perry
denies that the political morality of liberal democracy directly implies
exclusionist constraints on religious reasons.123 So, for example, the claim that
each human being has inherent dignity by itself implies only a very minimal,
moral limitation on religious reasons. Moreover, there is no indirect route from
that dignity claim, via some version of the familiar argument from respect, to
any more robust constraint on religious reasons. Perry concludes otherwise in

of some liberal democracies, such as the non-establishment norm.
119
See PERRY, POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1, at 117.
120
See id. at 118.
121
A plausible rationale, I take it, is roughly one “that rational, well-informed, and thoughtful fellow
citizens could affirm.” Id. at 117.
122
It is unclear to me why Perry adopts the “plausible” rather than the more demanding “persuasive”
construction for which he argues in Perry, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 3, at 100–01.
123
PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 46.
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The Political Morality of Liberal Democracy.124 If he is correct, then there is a
rather direct route from the core claims of liberal democracy to a justificatory
constraint that targets religious reasons as such: the right to religious freedom is
the “sine qua non” of a liberal democracy and, properly understood, that right
precludes a liberal democracy from enacting any coercive or discriminatory law
that depends for its justification on a religious reason.125 Why does Perry think
that?
The right to religious freedom includes “not only freedom to practice one’s
own religion . . . but also freedom not to practice someone else’s religion—or
indeed, any religion at all.”126 That is, the right to religious freedom includes, at
its paradigmatic core, a right to be free of religious impositions. But a law for
which there exists no plausible secular rationale, one that cannot be justified
absent some religious rationale, is a religious imposition. It follows, then, that
the right to religious freedom precludes a liberal polity from enacting any
coercive or discriminatory policy for which there exists no plausible secular
rationale. So, Perry explains the following:
For a liberal democracy—any liberal democracy, including one not
constitutionally committed to “no ‘establishment’ of religion”—to
enact, maintain, or enforce a law that is bereft of a plausible secular
basis contravenes the right to religious freedom: Such a law
unacceptably imposes religion on those the law coerces or against
whom its discriminates.127

Although Perry does not explicitly say so, it is very plausible to suppose that no
citizen or state official may support a state policy that violates the right to
religious freedom. And so, I take it, Perry is committed to the following principle
of restraint: no citizen or state official may support any state policy for which
there exists no plausible secular rationale—not even if she rationally believes
there to be, and not even if in fact there exists, a sound religious rationale in
favor of that policy. This is, I have to say, a breathtakingly direct route to Perry’s
final destination! What should we make of it? Should we take the short route to
religious restraint?
Let me begin by clarifying the concept of a religious imposition. Consider
Perry’s claim that there are certain interests that any liberal polity may
legitimately protect or pursue: “Although no exhaustive list of such interests is
124
125
126
127

PERRY, POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1 at 100–97.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 154–55.
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possible, a ban that protects the lives, health, safety, liberty, property, or
socioeconomic well-being of the citizenry undeniably serves a legitimate
governmental interest, as does a ban on conduct that causes environmental
degradation or that abuses animals.”128 There are also “certain imaginable
governmental interests that cannot count as legitimate under the right to religious
freedom,” most particularly, protecting religious truth and “protecting the
religious unity of society.”129 We might think that a state policy that is
exclusively directed at pursuing or promoting an undeniably legitimate
governmental interest would not count as a religious imposition. Correlatively,
we might think that a state policy that does promote or protect either religious
truth or the religious unity of society would count as a religious imposition. In
both cases, it is the interests promoted or protected by a given policy, not the
reasons for adopting a policy, that determine whether it counts as a religious
imposition.
This is not Perry’s view. A policy that pursues an undeniably legitimate
interest, but for which there exists no plausible secular rationale, is a religious
imposition. Otherwise put, the fact that a state policy depends for its justification
on a religious rationale makes it the case that that policy is a religious imposition
even if it furthers an undeniably legitimate governmental interest. Perry
explains, “A coercive and/or discriminatory law for which the only rationale,
other than an implausible secular rationale, is religious imposes religion on those
the law coerces or against whom it discriminates.”130 It seems, then, for Perry,
the category of a religious imposition covers two importantly different kinds of
law: (1) a coercive law that serves an undeniably legitimate governmental
interest yet that depends for its justification on a religious rationale, and (2) a
coercive law that serves an illegitimate religious interest such as the protection
of religious truth or the religious unity of society.131 For Perry, both count as
religious impositions: the first by virtue of its justifying rationale and the second
by virtue of the religious interests it promotes. And both are precluded by the
right to religious freedom.132
Perry’s capacious understanding of what makes for a religious imposition is
crucial to his religious freedom argument in favor of the claim that citizens and
state officials ought not support coercive or discriminatory policies bereft of a
plausible secular rationale. But there is reason for skepticism. I grant that any
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 75.
Id. at 75, 78 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 119.
It would do so even if there was a plausible secular rationale in its favor, I assume.
Id. at 117–19.
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liberal state ought to protect the right to religious freedom, properly and robustly
understood. I grant as well that the right to religious freedom, properly
understood, precludes religious impositions—where a religious imposition is a
coercive or discriminatory law that promotes or protects the undeniably
illegitimate religious interests that Perry specifies, viz., religious truth and the
religious unity of society. As I see it, the right to religious freedom precludes a
law the purpose of which is to promote or protect religious truth, whatever the
reason for doing so, religious or secular (and, of course, there are many secular
reasons for the State to do so). But I doubt that the right to religious freedom,
properly understood, precludes religiously justified impositions—where a
religiously justified imposition is a coercive law that promotes or protects
undeniably legitimate governmental interests but depends for its justification on
a religious rationale. In short, I doubt that we should accept Perry’s claim that a
religiously justified imposition is an imposition of the sort that is prohibited by
the right to religious freedom. To the contrary, and very roughly, a coercive or
discriminatory state policy may be grounded on any rationale—religious or
secular—so long as it serves a legitimate state interest and is compatible with a
genuinely liberal commitment to human equality and a properly robust
understanding of the rights grounded thereupon.
How might we resolve this disagreement? We cannot merely have recourse
to the meaning of “religious” and “imposition.” No analysis of ordinary
language will resolve the question before us, as we are always free to alter the
meaning of the terms we employ as suits our moral and pragmatic imperatives.
What we need is some normative argument—some moral rationale in support of
claim that we should understand the right to religious freedom to preclude
coercive or discriminatory laws that lack a plausible secular rationale. As is often
the case, articulating why we should affirm a right (in this case, the right to
religious freedom) provides us with a principled way to determine which
disputed cases fall under that right and which do not.
Perry offers us such a rationale. In fact, he offers a two-pronged rationale for
his favored understanding of the right to religious freedom. First, we have
excellent reason to deny that political majorities and political authorities are
competent to assess religious claims on matters that fall outside of their domain
of legitimate authority.133 As I noted above, Perry claims that “[c]ertain
governmental interests are undeniably legitimate, and government must be
legally free to serve such interests—for example, protecting the lives, health,

133

Id. at 77–78.
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and safety of the citizenry.”134 With respect to matters that engage its legitimate
interests, government must act as an arbiter of religious truth: if in pursuit of
undeniably legitimate government interests, the State “implicitly reject[s] the
position of some religions,” then “in that limited sense,” the State does act as
“an arbiter of religious truth.”135 With respect to matters that fall outside the
scope of the State’s legitimate interests, government is utterly incompetent to
judge. We know from our observation of the historical record the State is not
competent to judge which religion is true or which religious practices are
salvific, and so a political majority ought to refrain from employing its coercive
power to impose religious uniformity or salvific practice.
To this first empirical argument in favor of the right to religious freedom,
Perry adds a second, equally empirical argument: “[T]he coercive imposition of
religious uniformity—if not necessary to serve some other, important
governmental interest, such as protecting the lives, health, or safety of the
citizenry—is more likely to corrode than to nurture the strength of a democracy,”
particularly a pluralistic liberal democracy like the United States.136 We know
from historical experience that when governments employ their coercive power
to shut down churches, compel assent to theological doctrines, humiliate
heretics, and on and on, they engender very troubling social and political
dysfunctions. Political majorities should therefore refrain from doing so by
respecting the right of individuals to practice their faith absent any unnecessary
interference.
Perry offers us here a plausible “ecumenical” argument in favor of the right
to religious freedom: “[A]ll citizens of liberal democracy—believers no less than
nonbelievers—have the same basic reason to embrace the right to religious
freedom.”137 Even so, I doubt that Perry’s rationale achieves the target result. It
provides compelling reason to prohibit religious impositions—coercive or
discriminatory measures that protect religious truth or religious unity. But it
provides no reason to prohibit religiously justified impositions—coercive or
discriminatory measures that serve legitimate state interests for which there exist
a religious but no plausible secular rationale. Two points seems particularly
worth making here.

134
135
136
137

Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
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First, Perry is careful not to claim that the political authorities are
incompetent to judge all religious matters.138 And this is a good thing: political
authorities must assume that they have the competence to judge religious matters
insofar as they bear on some legitimate governmental interest. They cannot
avoid doing so. So, for example, every liberal polity must protect its citizenry
from aggression by enemies; doing so requires that it form, train, and deploy a
military. Forming, training, and deploying its military against enemies is
incompatible with the claim that God absolutely forbids military violence, and
so a liberal polity must assume not only that this kind of religiously grounded
pacifism is false but also that the government is competent to make that
judgment.139 But then Perry’s competence rationale in favor of the right to
religious freedom provides insufficient reason to prohibit the state from enacting
any law for which there exists no plausible secular rationale: he neither claims
nor shows that political authorities lack the competence to assess religious
claims that bear on undeniably legitimate governmental interests. And if
political authorities are competent to assess religious reasons that bear on
legitimate state interests, then there seems to be no compelling reason to deny
that the State may enact a religiously justified imposition in the sense earlier
specified—a coercive law that promotes or protects undeniably legitimate
governmental interests but that depends for its justification on a religious
rationale.
The second reason that Perry offers in favor of the right to religious freedom
is the historical one: that the coercive enforcement of religious uniformity has
shown itself to be utterly disastrous: we should affirm the right to religious
freedom as a prophylactic for societal dysfunction.140 But it is unclear that this
argument provides us with a sufficient reason to understand that right in such a
way as to preclude religiously justified impositions. Plausibly, it is the
imposition of religious orthodoxy itself, irrespective of the reasons for that
imposition, that engenders societal dysfunction. Similarly, I doubt that
religiously justified laws that pursue undeniably legitimate state interests cause
societal dysfunction. As Perry argues in Under God?, it is not the case that
reliance on religious argument in public debate or political decision-making is
in general more divisive or controversial than reliance on all manner of secular
reasons.141 And so, as long as a coercive policy genuinely bears on undeniably

138

Id. at 77.
See Christopher J. Eberle, Religion, Pacifism, and the Doctrine of Restraint, 34 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS
203, 207 (2006).
140
PERRY, POLITICAL MORALITY, supra note 1, at 79.
141
PERRY, UNDER GOD?, supra note 4, at 48–49.
139
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legitimate governmental interests, it is doubtful that its lacking a plausible
secular rationale is likely to engender political strife or societal dysfunction. In
short, we should affirm the right to religious freedom; we should do so as a
prophylactic for societal strife; we thereby have reason to understand the right
to religious freedom to preclude religious impositions, but we do not thereby
have reason to understand the right to religious freedom as a ban on religiously
grounded impositions.
Neither of Perry’s two arguments in favor of the right to religious freedom
provide sufficient reason for us to construe it as banning religiously grounded
impositions. There is also independent reason to be skeptical of such a view. Let
it be granted that the State may enact only those laws that fall within some
jurisdictional space—some secular space, having to do with, as Perry says, “the
lives, health, or safety of the citizenry.”142 Let it be granted, that is, that the State
may, and even must, legislate in this area. Let it be granted as well that the State
may not legislate in areas outside of its legitimate jurisdiction. So let us consider
the moral status only of those laws that fall within the legitimate jurisdiction of
a liberal democratic state. On Perry’s conception of the right to religious
freedom, should some law be enacted that directly bears on the lives, health, or
safety of the citizenry and that also depends for its justification on some religious
rationale, then that law violates the right to religious freedom. On this
understanding, any law that depends for its justification on a religious rationale
is discredited—whatever its content, whatever the epistemic bona fides of that
rationale, however popular it happens to be, however plausible it seems, and
irrespective of its soundness.
Matters are very different with respect to laws that enjoy a plausible secular
rationale. Suppose that some coercive law falls within the legitimate
jurisdictional space of a liberal democratic state. Suppose that such a law enjoys
a plausible secular rationale—some plausible utilitarian or Kantian rationale.
Suppose that such a law lacks any plausible religious rationale. Is there anything
thereby problematic with respect to such a law? Does the fact that it enjoys a
plausible secular, but no plausible religious, rationale discredit it in any way?
Not as such. Of course, a plausible secular rationale can be defective in various
ways. But not by virtue of its having only a plausible secular and not a plausible
religious rationale; not, say, by virtue of its having only a plausible utilitarian
but no plausible Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, or Buddhist rationale. Here,
we see an asymmetry of justificatory force: the absence of any plausible secular
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rationale discredits, whereas the absence of any plausible religious rationale
does not discredit.
That differential treatment between the secular and the religious requires
justification: there must be some reason to discriminate between religious and
secular reasons, such that the latter enjoy a justificatory potential that none of
the former possess. It is hard to imagine what that justification would be.143 Here
it seems to me that Laborde’s disaggregative conception of the religious is most
helpful. There is too much internal differentiation as among distinct kinds of
religious and secular reasons to single religious reasons out for differential
treatment of the sort implicit in Perry’s most recent justificatory constraint. We
might well object to the liberal bona fides of certain religious reason, such that
some particular religious reason cannot serve as a basis for any coercive
measure—say a reason that denies, implicitly or explicitly, the equal and
inherent worth of all human beings. We might have particularistic objections to
select religious reasons, just as we might have particularistic objections to
certain secular reasons. This is an assessment of the justificatory role of religious
reasons that Perry powerfully demonstrates in his earlier work, particularly
Under God?. It is an assessment of religious reasons that nicely accords with a
commitment to the equal treatment of religious and secular reasons—a principle
of parity for which Perry also powerfully argued in Under God?. It is an
assessment of religious reasons that seems incompatible with his current views
on the matter. Which is just to say that there is reason for Perry to continue in
his quest for a genuinely ecumenical politics—in this case, by retracing his steps
to an earlier destination.144
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